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Hegel to Copleston 
Few modern philosophers have determined our understanding of early modern philosophy in 
the way Hegel has. More in particular, Hegel held highly influential views on the real 
significance of the language in which Philosophy came into its own after the Middle Ages. In 
his Lectures on the History of Philosophy Hegel introduced the issue in his paragraph on 
Luther, who completed his Reformation of Christianity, or so Hegel argued, by rendering the 
Bible into German, for according to Hegel philosophical self-consciousness can only be 
achieved in a native language, a language, that is, we can truly call our own. For, Hegel 
continued, only a language that is able to express our innermost concerns can serve as a 
vehicle for our subjectivity: 
In der Sprache ist der Mensch produzierend: es ist die erste Aüsserlichkeit, die der 
Mensch sich gibt durch die Sprache; es ist die erste, einfachste Form der Produktion, 
des Daseins, zu der er kommt im Bewusstsein; was der Mensch sich vorstellt, stellt er 
sich auch innerlich vor als gesprochen. Diese erste Form ist ein Gebrochenes, 
Fremdartiges, wenn der Mensch in einer fremden Sprache sich ausdrücken oder 
empfinden soll, was sein höchstes Interesse berührt. Dieser Bruch mit dem ersten 
Heraustreten in das Bewusstsein ist so aufgehoben; hier bei sich selbst in seinem 
Eigentum zu zein, in seiner Sprache zu sprechen, zu denken, gehört ebenso zur Form 
der Befreiung. Dies ist von unendlicher Wichtigkeit. Luther hätte nicht seine 
Reformation vollendet, ohne die Bibel ins Deutsch zu übersetzen; und nicht ohne diese 
Form, in eigener Sprache zu denken, hätte die subjektive Freiheit bestehen können.1 
 
According to Hegel, Luther constitutes such a pivotal moment in the history of Geist or Spirit, 
since the Reformation first affirmed the principle of self-consciousness – and this principle, 
Hegel felt, was the very principle of modern Philosophy itself.2 While this early nineteenth-
century conception of the rise of modern philosophy entails a highly normative conception of 
what philosophy really is, its insistence on the crucial dependence of genuine philosophical 
                                                 
1 Hegel, Werke XX, pp. 52-53.  
 
2 Ibid., p. 63. 
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reflection on the vernacular served until recently as a standard ingredient of scholarly 
descriptions of the incipience of modern philosophy.  
 Consider, for example, the way in which Frederick Copleston introduced the fourth 
volume, on Descartes to Leibniz, of his monumental History of Philosophy: 
whereas the mediaevals wrote in Latin, in the post-mediaeval period, we find an 
increasing use of the vernacular. It would not, indeed, be true to say that no use was 
made of Latin in the pre-Kantian modern period. Both Francis Bacon and Descartes 
wrote in Latin as well as in the vernacular. So too did Hobbes. And Spinoza composed 
his works in Latin. But Locke wrote in English, and in the eighteenth century we find 
a common use of the vernacular. Hume wrote in English, Voltaire and Rousseau in 
French, Kant in German.3 
 
Indeed, many sixteenth- and seventeenth-century names could be added, including 
Machiavelli and Bruno, Montaigne and Charron, Robert Hooke, Anne Conway and Sir 
Kenelm Digby, as well as Pascal, Malebranche, Jean Du Hamel, Pierre Bayle, Fénelon and 
Fontenelle. All this will be pretty familiar, as will be Copleston’s subsequent observation that 
the rise of the vernacular in early modern philosophy was closely related to the rapidly 
changing position in society of the philosopher: unlike their medieval predecessors, they, or to 
be more precise: the philosophers who made it to handbooks such as Copleston’s, were no 
longer employed as university professors. Bacon was a lawyer and a politician, Descartes a 
nobleman of independent means, Hobbes served as tutor and secretary to the Cavendish 
family, Spinoza was an optician who even refused a chair in Heidelberg, Locke was a 
physician, Leibniz a diplomat and a librarian, Berkeley a bishop, and so on. As a 
consequence, they were no longer bound by the conventions ruling academic scholarship, the 
main one being of course the use of Latin. 
 
Recent Revisionism 
Over the past few decades a lot of energy has been invested in dismantling this picture, 
according to which the rise of early modern philosophy: a) was expressed in the vernacular, 
and b) took place outside the universities, and I should now like to sketch six objections that 
could be made to it, most of them inspired by recent research, after which I hope to be in a 
position to assess its tenability. First, as Copleston himself observed already, Bacon, 
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 3 
Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza still used Latin – Spinoza even exclusively so, the single text 
of his that has survived in Dutch, the Korte Verhandeling, being a translation made by his 
Amsterdam friends.4 To his considerable chagrin, even Locke was quickly identified as the 
author of the anonymous Epistola de tolerantia, published at Gouda in 1689. Leibniz and 
Newton also wrote much of their work in Latin, as did Kant for that matter, for not only were 
Kant’s so-called ‘pre-critical’ works in Latin, from 1796 to 1798 Friedrich Gottlob Born 
issued a translation in four volumes, entitled Opera ad philosophiam criticam.5 In some cases 
the success a philosophical work enjoyed was solely due to its Latin translation: Campanella’s 
La Città del sole was largely ignored until the author himself produced a version in Latin.6 
When Descartes in 1619 met Isaac Beeckman at Breda, the future author of the Discours sur 
la méthode was only able to communicate with Beeckman because both men spoke Latin.7 
But also among the so-called minor authors of the age, dozens could be referred to who still 
published many of their most important works in Latin, including Marin Mersenne, Pierre 
Gassendi, Nicholas Malebranche, John Toland, Samuel Pufendorf, Christian Thomasius and 
Christian Wolff. What is more, not all seventeenth and eighteenth-century university 
professors felt obliged to publish exclusively in Latin: Galileo, Antoine Arnauld, Henri More 
and Ralph Cudworth all held important academic positions (only More, a Cambridge Fellow. 
never made it to a professorial chair, although he became prebend), and they al published 
primarily in their native languages.  
Neither does it appear to have been the case that the vernacular held any privileged 
position in proto-Enlightenment ‘liberating’ circles bent on castigating Christian ‘prejudice’: 
it is not as if the most ‘emancipatory’ thinkers opted for the vernacular out of principle. On 
the contrary, several of the most daring products of the early radical Enlightenment, including 
several anonymous clandestine manuscripts, were composed in Latin, as were for example, 
the Origo et fundamenta religionis Christianae, the Theophrastus redivivus, the Symbolum 
Sapientiae, the De vera religionis inventione et forma, the Jordanus Bruno redivivus as well 
as Friedrich Wilhelm Stosch’ Concordia rationis et fidei and Theodor Ludwig Lau’s 
                                                 
4 Spinoza, Korte Verhandeling, pp. 71-80. 
 
5 Immanuelis Kantii Opera. 
 
6 Waquet, Latin, or the Empire of a Sign, p. 87. 
 
7 Ibid., p. 154. 
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Meditationes philosophicae.8 Spinoza expressly forbade his friend to issue a Dutch translation 
of his hotly contested Tractatus theologico-politicus.9    
 Second, over the past few decades our understanding of the history of the early 
modern university has been increased dramatically, and few intellectual historians today will 
be prepared to be as dismissive of the academic practice of philosophy as was long 
customary.10 In particular the significance of universities for what is still, reluctantly, termed 
‘the scientific revolution’ has been reassessed fundamentally, leading the late great Roy Porter 
to conclude that although Galileo quit his chair at Padua in 1610 and Newton left Cambridge 
in 1696 to become Master of the Mint, ‘a remarkably high proportion of the great names of 
early modern science actually made their career (or at least embarked upon their career) as 
professors in university employment.’11 Moreover, the very domains which were transformed 
most fundamentally during the seventeenth century belonged to the core curriculum of the 
studium generale taught by the artes faculty, and by the end of the seventeenth century the 
gap which traditionally had separated natural philosophy from mathematics was beginning to 
close, especially in France and the Netherlands – arguably on account of the success of 
Cartesianism. And while the scientific importance of the medical research being done at 
Padua, Montpellier, Leiden, Oxford and Cambridge has been recognized for quite some time 
now, there is also considerable evidence suggesting that mathematics played a much larger 
role in many of the more prominent universities of the early modern age than academic 
statutes would seem to convey.   
 In addition, we should not overestimate the hostility among seventeenth-century 
‘novatores’ such as Descartes and Hobbes toward the early modern university; Descartes was 
very concerned to have his views taught at Utrecht, Leiden as well as the Sorbonne (and made 
sure to have his work translated into Latin as soon as possible; Hobbes, a major Classicist in 
his own right, seriously felt his Leviathan would make for a fine course in Oxford.12 Gassendi 
                                                 
8 Schröder, Ursprünge des Atheismus, Appendix. 
 
9 Spinoza, The Letters, p. 243. 
 
10 For a survey, see De Ridder-Symoens (ed.), Universities in the Middle Ages and (ed.), Universities in Early 
Modern Europe. 
 
11 Porter, ‘The Scientific Revolution and Universities’. See also, for instance, Gascoigne, ‘A Reappraisal’; 
Ruestow, Physics at Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century Leiden; Feingold, The Mathematician’s 
Apprenticeship; Brockliss, French Higher Education; Wallace, Galileo and his Sources; Vanpaemel, Echo’s van 
een wetenschappelijke revolutie. 
 
12 Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch; Serjeantson, ‘Hobbes, the Universities and the History of Philosophy’. 
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was a professor at the Collège Royal, Pierre Bayle held a chair at the Rotterdam Illustrious 
School - not very impressive perhaps, and he refused an offer from Franeker University, but it 
would seem that all German Cartesians were indeed professors, and one expert recently 
characterised Philosophy in seventeenth-century Germany as ‘overwhelmingly academic’.13 
And while it is true that the national societies, set up in France, Britain and Prussia for the 
advancement of science beyond the confines of the university, promoted the vernacular, as is 
evident from the publication of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society and from 
the decision of the Prussian Academy in 1745 to exchange Latin for French, both the 
Philosophical Transactions and the Journal des Savans were swiftly translated into Latin. The 
important German scientific journal Acta Eruditorum ran, exclusively in Latin, from 1682 to 
1782. The use of Latin in scholarly correspondence remained popular until well into the 
eighteenth century. Françoise Waquet wrote her study on the continuing relevance of Latin 
from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries after she had completed her book, co-written with 
Hans Bots, on the eighteenth-century Republic of Letters, in which the use of Latin remained 
a sign of distinction, of class if you will. ‘Democratic’ as this Republic may have been, it was 
of course inhabited only by people, mainly men, with a proper education.14  
 Third, many experts on early modern philosophy today have become very weary of 
presenting Descartes as the unique point of departure, the decisive step forward to modernity 
in the way Hegel, Copleston and the authors of countless other surveys of seventeenth-century 
thought have attempted to do. Instead, they have become acutely conscious of the continuity 
between Descartes and the Scholastic background Descartes himself professed to have 
obliterated. In fact, from Étienne Gilson to Jean-Luc Marion, Dennis Des Chene and Roger 
Ariew, a powerful scholarly tradition has arisen which has demonstrated the extent to which 
Descartes depended on the very Aristotelian natural philosophy he claimed to have destroyed 
once and for all.15 Over the past few decades, early modern Aristotelianism has made a 
particularly robust comeback on the scholarly agenda of historians of philosophy both in 
England and the United States and on the European Continent.16 The result is that since also 
                                                 
13 Hunter, ‘The University Professor in Early Modern Germany’. On Gassendi, see below, on Bayle: Bost, Pierre 
Bayle; on German Cartesianism: Trevisani, Descartes in Germania.  
 
14 Bots and Waquet, La République des lettres, esp. pp. 146-148. See also Goldgar, Impolite Learning.  
 
15 See most notably Gilson, Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale; Marion, Sur le prisme métaphysique de 
Descartes; Des Chene, Physiologia; Ariew, Descartes and the Last Scholastics. 
 
16 Randall, The School of Padua; Schmitt, Aristotle and the Renaissance; Mercer, ‘The Vitality and Importance 
of Early Modern Aristotelianism’; Grant, The Foundations of Modern Science; Di Liscia, Kessler and Methuen 
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Spinoza has been studied from that point of view recently, no major seventeenth-century 
philosopher before Locke, has now not been commented upon at length from a Peripatetic 
perspective.17   
More in general, today the recognition of the continuing popularity of the competing 
Classical schools of thought such as Stoicism, Epicureanism, and of course Scepticism or 
Pyrrhonism during the early modern age is widely shared among historians of philosophy.18 
And while the fate of Platonism following the Italian quattrocento is far less well 
documented,19 a fascinating phenomenon like the seventeenth-century ‘Cambridge Platonists’ 
demonstrates that even an almost obsessive preoccupation with the wisdom of the Ancients 
did not have to imply a preference for the use of Latin: as noted, both Henri More and Ralph 
Cudworth wrote their most important treatises in English. 
 Fourth, it might be worthwhile to pause and reflect on the use of language in the 
school of thought which traditionally has been regarded as the terminus ad quem of early 
modern philosophy, namely German Idealism, for its particular use of the German language 
has always given rise to comments. In particular Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft is heavy 
with such a peculiar terminology of Kant’s own making that many of its first readers were 
baffled by its idiom. Translating Kant’s ‘transcendental’ philosophy into other native 
languages turned out to be no easy feat: the Dutch Kantian Paulus van Hemert was chastised 
by his contemporary critics for the highly peculiar ‘Dutch’ he used – Van Hemert actually 
invented many new words in order to bring home Kant’s ‘critical’ philosophy.20 Early 
nineteenth-century critics of Kant accused him of having reinstalled just another variant of 
Scholasticism – not unlike the way in which some twentieth-century philosophers have come 
                                                                                                                                                        
(eds.), Method and Order in Renaissance Philosophy of Nature; Blackwell and Kusukawa (eds.), Philosophy in 
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries; Ariew and Gabey, ‘The Scholastic Background’.     
 
17 See for instance Schuhmann, ‘Hobbes and Renaissance Philosophy’; Leijenhorst, The Mechanization of 
Aristotelianism; Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics; Osler, Divine Will and the Mechanical Philosophy as well as 
several of the essays presented in Sorell (ed.), The Rise of Modern Philosophy and Manzini, Spinoza. 
 
18 See for instance Popkin, The History of Scepticism; Schmitt, Cicero Scepticus; Oestreich, Neostoicism and the 
Early Modern State; Wilson, Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity. 
 
19 See, however, Hedley and Hutton (eds.), Platonism at the Origins of Modernity. 
 
20 One of the most vociferous critics of Van Hemert was the Amsterdam and Leiden professor Daniel 
Wyttenbach, who was a born Swiss and who still published exclusively in Latin: Von Prantl, ‘Daniel 
Wyttenbach als Gegner Kants’. On the early Dutch reception of Kantianism, see more recently Van Hemert, 
Gezag en grenzen van de menselijke rede; Wielema, ‘Die erste niederländische Kant-Rezeption’; Hanou, Sluiers 
van Isis; Onnasch, ‘De eerste receptie van Kants filosofie in Nederland’; Franke, Een gedeelde wereld?, Chapter 
3.  
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to regard the tradition of what for want of a better word is still referred to as ‘analytical 
philosophy’.  
 This brings me to a fifth objection: is it really true that Medieval philosophy was 
exclusively scholastic, that is put into the Latin we associate with Aquinas, Duns Scotus and 
William of Ockham? Or is it possible to identify philosophical traditions in the vernacular 
before, say: Machiavelli? According to Ruedi Imbach it most certainly is, for two reasons in 
particular: one the one hand, well before the end of the fourteenth century several key texts in 
philosophy had been translated into the native languages of Europe: Boethius’ De 
consolatione philosophiae, for instance, by 1400 was available in fourteen different versions 
in French alone.21 On the other hand, Imbach has identified ‘lay’ authors active during the 
High Middle Ages, including many who had little use for Latin, including (the unfortunately 
named) Brunetto Latini, to whom many examples could be added from the tradition I know 
best: the Dutch.22  
 As early as 1267 Jacob van Maerlant wrote ‘scholastica willic ontbinden. In dietsche 
wort uten latine’ (‘I wish to liberate scholasticism from its Latin shackles and render it in 
Dutch.’).23 Closely associated with the court of Floris V, count of Holland, Van Maerlant 
produced a remarkable series of philosophical translations, including the popular pseudo-
Aristotelian Secreta secretorum as well as an Encyclopedia on the wonders of Nature and a 
dialogue on a wide variety of ethical subjects – all in Dutch, or ‘Dietsch’ as Van Maerlant 
would have it. Thus, he created a philosophical vocabulary in the vernacular which around 
1400 was further developed by Dirc van Delft and by the many contemporary translations 
made of the writings of Geert Grote and the other members of the devotio moderna. 
Consequently, at the dawn of the early modern age even such minor provinces of the Holy 
Roman Empire as the Netherlands had a pretty elaborate philosophical vocabulary at their 
disposal. 
Finally, and arguably most importantly, the Hegelian vision according to which no 
genuinely innovative work in philosophy could be done before Descartes identified the 
subject as the locus from which the Spirit could unfold itself and thus put the wheel in motion 
toward its ultimate self-discovery, hinges on the presupposition that the Renaissance, as Jacob 
                                                 
21 Imbach, Laien in der Philosophie des Mittelalters, pp. 43-52. 
 
22 Ibid., pp. 53-66. 
 
23 Krop, ‘De wijsbegeerte en het Nederlands’, p. 82. This article has been a great help in the preparation of this 
lecture. See also Nitschik, Das volkssprachliche Naturbuch; Van Oostrom, Maerlants wereld.  
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Burckhardt put it in his seminal Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien, did not produce any 
original philosophy of its own.24 Now as a matter of fact, possibly the greatest twentieth-
century scholar of Renaissance humanism basically agreed, for according to Paul Oskar 
Kristeller Renaissance humanism as a professional endeavour did not really include 
philosophy:  
Much of the work of leading humanists and all of the work of many minor humanists 
has no significance whatsoever for philosophy in any sense of the term but only for 
scholarship and literature. Vice versa, much of the philosophical literature of the 
Renaissance was not due to the humanists, but to Aristotelian philosophers with a 
scholastic training, to Platonist metaphysicians influenced by both humanism and 
scholasticism and above all by Plato and Neoplatonists such as Ficino and his 
followers, or to original thinkers, marginally influenced by humanism, from Nicholas 
of Cusa down to Telesio, Bruno and Francis Bacon.25  
 
Two observations seem in place: first, it could be argued that, from an early modern 
perspective, it was hardly self-evident that Philosophy should be original or innovative at all. 
Indeed, Descartes and his first supporters were actually accused of wanting to introduce all 
sorts of ‘novelties’. Why, many seventeenth-century thinkers still felt, should we be at all 
committed to change let alone abandon Aristotelianism? As a highly flexible, universally 
applicable conceptual vocabulary, it served to articulate our common-sense experience of the 
world we live in. It is not as if Descartes had established its deficiencies. He merely presented 
an alternative view of the world that incidentally made the universe look very odd indeed and 
very different from the way we experience it to be.26 By the middle of the seventeenth century 
it remained very much to be seen whether Descartes’ vision of philosophy as a project of 
future enquiry, in which the use of Latin was no longer self-evident, would actually prevail. 
Second, several prominent, more recent specialists on Humanism, that is on the 
intellectual movement flowering between the death of William of Ockham in 1347 and the 
publication of Descartes’ works in the 1640s, have been pretty successful in demonstrating 
that from Lorenzo Valla onward, ‘humanist’ thinkers had a far more profound effect on 
                                                 
24 Burkhardt, Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien. This view was criticised already by Cassirer, Individuum 
und Kosmos. 
 
25 Kristeller, ‘Humanism’, pp. 133-134. 
 
26 Van Ruler, The Crisis of Causality; Verbeek, ‘Dutch Cartesian Philosophy’. 
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philosophy and theology for that matter than Burckhardt’s and Kristeller’s views allowed 
for.27 The Dutch historian of philosophy Lodi Nauta has recently made an impressive attempt 
to turn Valla into a genuine precursor of ‘ordinary language philosophy’.28 
Still, humanist authors excelled at nothing as much as they did in writing Latin, 
although it was precisely their linguistic acumen that also enabled them to produce important 
translations, empowering philosophical discourse beyond the confines of the university 
throughout Europe  - consider, to name just one, particularly illuminating example Jill 
Kraye’s paper on Thomas Gataker’s rendering into English of Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations: 
among classicists, Gataker’s translation from 1652 still stands as a marvel of scholarship, yet 
by historians of philosophy it has been ignored completely.29 And not all humanists preferred 
Latin: from Montaigne through Bayle right up to Vico, a powerful tradition of profound, 
‘humanist’ erudition expressed in the vernacular established a connection between ‘humanist’ 
scholarship and cutting-edge philosophical analysis, turning, if you will, ‘the Renaissance’ 
into the natural cradle of ‘the Enlightenment’. 
 
Hegel Vindicated 
It would seem, then, when all is said and done, that the Hegelian point of view on the rise of 
the vernacular in Philosophy as a token of its budding modernity stands in need of urgent 
qualification. Or should we, perhaps, abandon it altogether? I think not: for despite our 
increased awareness of the continuities between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ philosophies in the early 
modern age, and despite the evident connections between ‘lay’ philosophers opting for the 
vernacular and professional academics communicating exclusively in Latin, this did not alter 
the fact that Latin was a dead language. As such, it could only be resuscitated at the expense 
of its purity. Moreover, the seventeenth century in particular witnessed a profound shift in 
‘paradigm’ if you will: in natural philosophy as well as in metaphysics, from cosmography to 
the definition of matter and the explanation of change and motion, there is simply a world of 
difference between, say the Cambridge Platonists and their contemporary John Locke, and not 
the least of these changes directly concerns the use of the vernacular. Whereas More and 
Cudworth were still inspired by the vision of an ‘Ancient Wisdom’, an essentially timeless 
                                                 
27 See for instance the essays collected in Kraye and Stone (eds.), Humanism and Early Modern Philosophy. 
Antony Grafton’s justly famous collection of essays entitled Defenders of the Text has little to offer on 
Philosophy. See, however, Gaukroger, Francis Bacon.  
 
28 Nauta, In Defense of Common Sense. 
 
29 Kraye, ‘“Ethnicorum omnium sancticissimus.”’ 
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prisca sapientia, by contrast Locke’s conception of philosophy as the task of what he called 
‘an Underlabourer’ is completely oriented toward the future elucidation of issues concerning 
theory of knowledge. When natural philosophy, which during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries had still served as the major arena in which the great battle between ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
conceptions of philosophy had been raging, grew into natural science, epistemology became 
the chief concern of philosophy, but as such it remained closely associated with the latest 
developments in physics in particular. Thus, the relevance of Classical philosophy gradually 
evaporated as did the use for Latin. As Peter Burke has pointed out, of the over 500 early 
modern translations from the vernacular into Latin that have been identified by him a mere 18 
titles belong to Philosophy.30  
What is more, if we take a closer look at for instance the Dutch example, which I just 
happen to be most familiar with, it simply cannot be denied that from the early nineteenth 
century onward the use of Latin in Philosophy became very rare indeed. Although Dutch was 
a relatively young language, it had a considerable philosophical tradition that was closely 
related to its codification. Only by the second half of the sixteenth century, at a time when the 
Southern Netherlands had turned into a very wealthy province of the Spanish empire and the 
Dutch Revolt was about to launch the Dutch Republic as a sovereign state, did the 
codification of the Dutch language get under way. The first Dutch grammar was published in 
1564, probably by Dirk Volkertsz. Coornhert, a personal friend of William of Orange and the 
author as well of the first Dutch Ethics in the vernacular, entitled Zedekunst (1586). Recent 
research has established, however, that Coornhert stood in a considerable literary tradition of 
moral reflection in the Dutch language, which may perhaps help to explain the stunning self-
consciousness of a host of humanist scholars active around 1600 and arguing with great zeal 
for the exceptional excellence of the Dutch language.31 The Antwerp scholar and personal 
physician to Philip II (who according to Venetian diplomats ‘spoke Latin quite well, for a 
prince’32), Johannes Becanus, went to considerable lengths in order to demonstrate that it was 
in reality the language spoken by Adam and Eve.33 
                                                 
30 Burke, ‘Translation into Latin in Early Modern Europe’. See also Grant, ‘European Vernacular Works in Latin 
Translation’. 
 
31 Buys, De kunst van het weldenken. See also Bange, Moraliteyt saelt wesen.  
 
32 Waquet, Latin, or the Empire of a Sign, p. 154.  
33 Van Hal, ‘Moedertalen en taalmoeders’, pp. 83-136.  
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During the seventeenth century the rapidly increasing importance of Dutch in 
philosophy is evident not only from the many excellent translations produced both of Frank 
Burgersdijk’s Aristotelian handbooks and of the writings of Descartes and Spinoza.34 For in 
addition radical Cartesians such as Lodewijk Meyer and Adriaan Koerbagh also composed 
highly interesting dictionaries, explicitly aimed at ‘enlightening’ the common man.35 Adriaan 
Koerbagh, who died in jail in Amsterdam in 1669, having been prosecuted for ‘atheism’, 
articulated what could perhaps be called a ‘political linguistics’, according to which Latin had 
essentially become a power tool in the hands of the legal as well as the clerical ‘professions’, 
creating an ignorant and therefore powerless ‘clientele’ of people who had simply been unable 
to afford a university education. 
Although the Radical Enlightenment envisaged by Meyer and Koerbagh failed to 
make a lasting impact on the Dutch Republic, the abundant availability in the vernacular of  
‘new’ and potentially revolutionary philosophical texts around 1700 gave rise to a very lively 
philosophical culture – all sorts of laymen, some of them female, with little or no Latin at all 
now felt able and entitled to take part in highly obtuse metaphysical disputes concerning the 
nature of God, the essence of the soul and the definition of matter.36 When the Amsterdam 
minister Balthasar Bekker launched his broadly Cartesian attack on belief in witchcraft and 
sorcery, entitled De betoverde Weereld (1691-93), dozens of amateur philosophers and 
theologians joined the fray.37 By this time, Dutch professors of philosophy and theology no 
longer felt inhibited either to cross swords with laymen in Dutch. 
During the eighteenth century Dutch philosophers would continue to publish in their 
native language although in the siècle des Lumières another second language quickly became 
increasingly important: when Latin did start to give way several prominent Dutch authors 
such as Justus van Effen, Belle van Zuylen and Frans Hemsterhuis wrote largely and in Van 
Zuylen’s and Hemsterhuis’ cases exclusively in French. The second half of the eighteenth 
century witnessed yet another flowering of Dutch philosophical literature, this time of a 
largely political nature, but from a European perspective the efforts of these late eighteenth-
                                                 
34 Dibbets, ‘Kóks Burgersdijkvertalingen’; Thijssen-Schoute, ‘Jan Hendrik Glazemaker’; Akkerman, Studies in 
the Posthumous Works of Spinoza, Chapter 5. 
 
35 Israel, Radical Enlightenment, Chapters 10 and 11; Den Boer, ‘Le Dictionnaire libertin d’Adriaen Koerbagh’; 
Koerbagh, A Light Shining in Dark Places. The relevant literature on Meyer and Koerbagh and many other 
minor Dutch authors of the time can be found in Van Bunge et al. (eds.), Dictionary. 
 
36 Israel, Radical Enlightenment, passim; Wielema, The March of the Libertines.  
 
37 Fix, Fallen Angels; Van Bunge, From Stevin to Spinoza, Chapter 5; Israel, Radical Enlightenment, Chapter 21. 
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century authors mattered little if only since they were essentially concerned to diagnose the 
sorry state of the Dutch Republic itself. But it’s true that Dutch Enlightenment discourse was 
almost univocally in Dutch and intentionally so. Using Latin in Philosophy beyond the 
academic classroom became, indeed, antiquated.38 
Important as the late eighteenth-century may have been in relation to the ensuing 
creation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the inward-looking nature of its philosophical 
thought prevented it from rising above an essentially local relevance.39 Unfortunately, much 
the same must be said of Dutch nineteenth-century philosophy. Disappointing as the writings 
of for instance Philip Willem van Heusde and Cornelis Opzoomer may appear to us, their 
contemporary impact was considerable, not only within the Dutch universities, but in a very 
real sense they also served as public intellectuals.40 Although Dutch academic orations as well 
as dissertations continued to be in Latin until the middle of the nineteenth century, to all 
intents and purposes Opzoomer was delighted to be able to publish his findings in his native 
language. Perfectly in tune with the creation, in 1813, of a new Kingdom of the Netherlands, - 
and, I should add, the creation in 1797 at Leiden of the first chair for Dutch linguistics41 - the 
call for a genuinely ‘Dutch’ philosophy was ubiquitous.42  
Thus it would seem that the final blow to the use of Latin in philosophy was delivered 
neither by scholarly, scientific or strictly philosophical developments, nor by the increasingly 
awkward fact that Latin was a dead language, the idiom of which had to be stretched 
constantly in order to fit a world packed with canons, steamships, and countless other objects 
Cicero could not have dreamt of, but by the rise of the nineteenth-century nation-state. It 
should be noted that Hegel’s appreciation of the vernacular had been prepared in considerable 
detail by Fichte’s Reden an die deutsche Nation (1808), delivered in Berlin during the French 
occupation. Only a living language Fichte had argued in his fourth address, which articulates 
the way in which a people actually experiences the world it inhabits is able to express a 
meaningful reflection of this very experience. Even single words that are ‘foreign’ to the 
                                                 
38 Kloek and Mijnhardt, 1800, esp. Chapters 13 and 19. See also Van Sas, De metamorfose van Nederland; 
Velema, Republicans. 
 
39 De Quay, De genoegzaamheid van het natuurlijk gezond verstand, Chapter 6. 
 
40 See Van Heusde, Wijsbegeerte van het gezonde verstand; Opzoomer, Het wezen der kennis. 
 
41 Held by Matthijs Siegenbeek. See Noordegraaf, Norm, geest en geschiedenis; De Vries (ed.),‘Eene 
bedenkelijke nieuwigheid.’  
 
42 Krop, ‘De wijsbegeerte en het Nederlands’, pp. 109-112. 
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German Language will inevitably evoke artificial sentiments. We know, Fichte claimed, what 
‘Menschlichkeit’ means, but which ideas is a concept like ‘Humanität’ supposed to instil?43 
Indeed, the continuing, unbroken and untainted vitality of the German language, Fichte 
concluded, will assure the German people of a glorious future, in particular in Philosophy. 
Prefiguring not only Hegel, but also and more ominously Heidegger, Fichte felt that any 
future true philosophy would have to be German: 
Die wahre, in sich selbst zu Ende gekommene und über die Erscheinung hinweg 
wahrhaft zum Kerne derselben durchgedrungene Philosophie hingegen geht aus von 
dem Einen, reinen, göttlichen Leben, – als Leben schlechtweg, welches es auch in alle 
Ewigkeit, und darin immer Eines bleibt, nicht aber als von diesem oder jenem Leben; 
und sie sieht, wie lediglich in der Erscheinung dieses Leben unendlich fort sich 
schliesse und wiederum öffne, und erst diesem Gesetze zufolge es zu einem Seyn und 
zu einem Etwas überhaupt komme. Ihr entsteht das Seyn, was jene sich vorausgeben 
lässt. Und so ist denn diese Philosophie recht eigentlich nur deutsch, d. i. ursprünglich; 
und umgekehrt, so jemand nur ein wahrer Deutscher würde, so würde er nicht anders 
denn also philosophiren können.44 
  
The political development of the rise of the nation-state largely coincided with the moment 
Philosophy returned to the university – a university, moreover, that during the nineteenth 
century abandoned the use of Latin. After Kant most of the major philosophers once more 
were professors: from Kant to Hegel and from Hegel to Husserl and Heidegger, from Comte 
to Derrida and from Mill to Quine – even Nietzsche embarked on his career as an academic, 
and even Wittgenstein’s return to philosophy took the shape of his return to Cambridge in 
1929. (A few hours after Wittgenstein’s arrival, John Maynard Keynes wrote a letter to a 
friend, announcing ‘God has arrived. I met him on the 5.15 train.’45)    
 
Conclusion 
In 1751, in his Discours préliminaire to the Encyclopédie, d’Alembert observed the gradual 
decline of Latin and ‘l’usage de toute écrire aujourdhui en langue vulgaire.’ While 
                                                 
43 Fichte, Sämtliche Werke VII, pp. 311-28. 
 
44 Ibid., VII, p. 362. On the Heidegger connection, see Sluga, Heidegger’s Critics; Bambach, Heidegger’s Roots; 
Rockmore, ‘Fichte, Heidegger, and Nazis’.   
 
45 Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein, p. 255. 
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d’Alembert acknowledged the advantages of this for French philosophes, he was also weary 
of where this might lead to, for today, he continued, even Englishmen write in their native 
language and even in Germany Latin is losing ground. Soon ‘Swedes, Danes and Russians’ 
will opt for the vernacular: 
Ainsi avant la fin du XVIIIe siècle, un philosophe qui voudra s’instruire à fond des 
découvertes de ses prédécesseurs, sera constraint de charger sa mémoire de sept à huit 
langues différentes; et après avoir consumé à les apprendre le temps le plus précieux 
de sa vie, il mourra avant de commencer à s’instruire. L’usage de la langue latine (..) 
ne pourrat être que très utile dans les ouvrages de philosophie, dont la clarté et la 
précision doivent faire tout le mérite, et qui n’ont besoin que d’une langue universelle 
et de convention. Il serait donc à souhaître qu’on rétablit cet usage: mail il n’y a pas 
lieu de l’esperer.46   
 
Latin did not return, and D’Alembert knew full well that it wouldn’t – not in philosophy, that 
is. In the 1770s, the French journalist Jacques Vincent Delacroix compared Latin to a house 
‘richement meublée, spacieuse et abandonée’.47  
 
Over the past few decades Philosophy has once more become a discipline in which a single 
language has come to dominate. Today professional philosophers who were not born in an 
Anglophone country are again challenged by the necessity to express themselves and 
communicate in a foreign language. Although most of us continue to publish in English and 
in Dutch, many of us feel our Dutch papers and books do not really count – even when 
English and American colleagues exhort us not to abandon our native language, as did the 
members of the committee responsible for the most recent Research Assessment of 
Philosophy in the Netherlands.48 Perhaps the bilingualism of our early modern predecessors 
may carry some consolation, for it would seem that, in the end, it did not really matter that 
Montaigne and Descartes wrote in French, Spinoza and Newton in Latin, and Leibniz in both: 
they were all read and they are still being studied today. We have only just begun to seriously 
question the reasons why some early modern philosophers made it to the canon, while others 
                                                 
46 D’Alembert, Discours préliminaire, pp. 153-154.  
 
47 Burke, ‘Heu domine, adsunt Turcae’, pp. 29-30. 
 
48 http://www.qanu.nl/comasy/uploadedfiles/philosophy_def.pdf, p. 13. 
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didn’t.49 Easy answers do not seem available, and canons evolve, but one could be forgiven to 
expect that in the long run, philosophers who opted for the vernacular did increase the 
accessibility of their writings: perhaps Gassendi could have made a bigger impact, had he not 
chosen to publish massive, intricate volumes such as his Disquisitio metaphysica of 1644. But 
then again, the beautiful and highly accessible English produced by eminent scholars such as 
Henri More and Ralph Cudworth could not ensure them a position in the Canon of European 
Philosophy either. The fact that their work was also translated into Latin could not make any 
difference. 
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